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The paper addresses an important issue of pricing mechanisms is
spatially distributed systems with losses, with an application to water
supply system. When losses from delivery are high, the asymmetry
of spatial location of consumers plays an important role, which is
captured by the model. The goal is to compare the eciency from
alternative market structures for water supply. The model can be ap-
plied for channels aimed on water redistribution. In particular, the
model can be relevant for analysing dierent market structures, equi-
librium water pricing and eciency for the planned channel between
river Ebro (Spain) and communities Valencia and Murcia. While this
paper is purely theoretical, it addresses the issues that are still lit-
tle understood at administrative level. Water market as described is
a necessity, but it will not emerge spontaneously and it requires ap-
propriate legislative preparation. Mathematical model is designed in
terms of densities and 
ows of corresponding economic variables.
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11 Introduction
The idea of the paper is to study equilibrium pricing and eciency in dier-
ent market organizations in industries with physical networks. Water supply
belongs to one of them. The basic dierence of this market structure from
classical approach in microeconomics is explicit accounting for initial het-
erogeneity in location of producers and consumers that comes from history
or geography. Asymmetric access to market takes place only if transmission
costs are signicant (not negligible) in comparison with other costs. We start
from dierent examples, which might result in completely dierent papers,
since every industry has its particularity.
1.1 Water Channel in a Desert
Cara-cum channel bringing water from Amu-Darja to villages of Turkmenia.
Historically it was constructed as a public good nanced by state (USSR)
and no microeconomic eciency was considered at that stage. Now, during
transition to market economies, in Central Asia, the issue of eciency be-
comes important. There is also a negative externality for ecology: Aral Sea
is gradually dying as more water is taken out from the river that is sucient
for environmental equilibrium. It also may become a source of cross-country
con
ict, since benets are derived by Turkmenistan while losses are mostly
for Aral Sea countries: Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The channel of the
length about 1000 km does not have a perfect engineering design, and losses
from evaporation and ltration are substantial. The more distant is loca-
tion from the river, the higher are losses. Consider alternative possibilities
of market organization. The rst is public good provided by state for free.
In this example, water is not a pure public good. The second possibility is
to have a monopolist owning the whole infrastructure. If water provider is
a (natural) monopolist, it has a possibility to have or have no spatial price
discrimination. Uniform pricing has a clearly negative eect, since marginal
cost to supply 1 cubic meter of water for 1000 km is much higher than to
supply the same amount at the distance of 100 km. However, spatial pricing
requires a perfect accounting system, which might not exist at the present.
21.2 Channel in Spain
There also exists a practical necessity to address the problem of ecient
water pricing. When water is scarce, it enters the production function as
more important factor then some of the rest factors. Since channel has a
particular topology, we are not in the environment of an equal access of
all consumers to the market. This gives a possibility of emergence of game
between communities with inecient blocking strategies if not all character-
istics of initial endowments and game structure are taken into account. For
example, at present water-exporting communities of Aragon and Catalonia
are against such a channel while water-importing communities of Valencia
and Murcia are in favour of it. This model shows that equilibrium pricing
of water should be a function of distance that water passes in a channel. In
other words, Murcia should pay more for unit of water in a channel than
the price in Southern Catalonia. If such setting would be done by central
planner, it can eliminate non-ecient bargaining that now takes place. Also,
participants of the market will understand the real value of water and set
their production plans taking this into account. As it is shown, water pric-
ing will also have an impact on agricultural land rent in dierent locations,
and this rent will jump to a new equilibrium as soon as pricing rules will be
settled.
While it is possible to consider an alternative formulation of the problem,
with a nite set of communities as economic actors, the focus of the present
model will be on general equilibrium framework, when each participant has
no market power and has to accept the rules of the game set by central
planner. 1
2 New Type of Market: The Mix of Techno-
logical and Legal Issues
2.1 Related Economic Studies
Classical microeconomic theory normally considers a market like something
that does not have spatial dimension (think about central square in a me-
1It is also true that such rules are normally taken as given in economic models and not
set by a participant having stronger power, although in real life this can be often the case,
especially when law is not set or not respected.
3dieval town) and does not address the issue of spatially distributed markets.
However, there exist some tradition to approach this issue from dierent
perspectives. At the empirical level, there exist few studies related to con-
struction of maps with price isolines. This approach was popular in the
beginning of the 20th century, and the author is familiar only with two maps
of this type. The rst one presents the isolines of potato pricing in the USA
(reproduced in [1]), and another example is related to isoprices of grain in
Russia [2]. It is not very clear why such research do not take place nowadays.
The author may have several hypothesis:
a) spatial pricing data form strategic information for some multinational
companies and they avoid to make it public;
b) while 100 years ago transport costs and geographical latitude really made
price of agricultural products a spatial variable, it is no longer the case,
because almost perfect competition across small farmers eroded and was re-
placed by competition across intermediaries, which use local monopoly power
to buy inputs and then sell at the prices that include not only transport cost
but some information rent2;
c) the role of agricultural sector in GDP is declining, and there is less interest
to such studies;
d) transport costs are declining with technological development, and economists
believe that such eects are no longer important.3
As for economic theory, only partial analysis of such distributed systems
has been developed. For example, Chamberlin [7] studies monopolistic com-
petition on a line, where producers are discrete and consumers are contin-
uously distributed. In this case, there exist an area near the any producer
where it possesses local monopoly power. He may apply dierent pricing
strategies there (see Beckmann, Thisse (1986) for details). In the model of
Hotelling the spatial structure is similar, however two rms compete on in-
terval and can choose location. Later d'Aspremont, Gabzewich and Thisse
2The issue of sharp rise of fresh food in Spain in 2003 became a hot political issue, so
that some universities in Madrid made case studies and suggested to mark two prices at
each product in supermarket, one of producer and second of retailer, to see whether rising
production cost really explains the dierence
3On the other hand, it is a well known mathematical result that the limit structure
when some parameter vanishes to zero not always coincide with just setting it to zero.
Simple example is l'Hopitale rule, but there exist more complex examples with metrics in
functional spaces.
4(1979) have found a problem with existence of Nash equilibrium in tradi-
tional model of Hotelling, suggested a remedy in a form of quadratic cost
and thus moved the focus of research of industrial organization literature to
product space, away from linear transport costs.
However, linear transport costs are important in many applications, and
they are related to physical losses in distributed systems. And there are at
least two cases not related to agriculture directly, where losses are almost
linear in distance, substantial and the system is continuous in space. The
rst example is related to electricity transmission. On average, 10 % of it
is lost during transmission, and this makes such losses not negligible from
economic point of view, although most of the countries have not even thought
about such component as market issue4. The second example is water pricing
in a channel, the problem that this study is addressing.
2.2 Legal Issues and Market Structures
If the marginal price of water in Murcia is let say 2 Euro per cuic meter,
while in Catalonia only 1 Euro, there is a room to improve ecient water
use by opening trade. However, contrary to nancial instruments, it is not
sucient to start trading water assets on stock exchange. The problem is
that water has to be delivered rst, and here we rst face construction costs.
But that is not all, to start trading water, it is necessary to set ownership
rights for it. While in many states water is virtually free (although water
distributors charge price for its delivery from consumers), it is no longer the
case in some areas. In the case of Spain, its southern regions has water as
scarce product, and thus have to use it eciently. Ecient use implies price
mechanism, and in the case of water its price should dier from one to other
geographical point.
If there exist some endowment (supply) and some demand in dierent
geographical points and if delivery is costly and/or includes physical losses
(like Samuleson's melting, in our case - evaporation), dierent methodology
for price setting should be used. Partly it was developed in Ph.D. thesis
of Yegorov (1999), in the chapter \Equilibrium in continuous space under
decentralized production". There each point in continuous space had some
4For more details of elaboration along these lines, see Yegorov [5]
5production and consumption density , varying continuously, and each local
producer was facing export 
ow through his point and had to decide how
much to produce and how much to export, taking the local price as given
(and it emerged as a continuous function of spatial coordinate).
In the case of water along channel we also can have similar formulation,
if we allow to build small plants to produce water in every point. Given the
dierence in local demand and price across points, the optimal capacity pat-
tern should be chosen. Speaking about Spanish reality, such a formulation is
also possible, since there exists a lot of salt water in sea and the technology
to transform it in unsalted water, using some energy input. But we will not
address this problem at current stage, as there exist more obstacles of math-
ematically simpler origin.
The rst problem is related to ownership. At present, water is owned
by state. While dierent communities have dierent water endowment, it
is central planner (in Madrid) that currently decides how to use this water.
Hence, the water does not have market price, but it has value. If central
planner would like to transfer some endowment from one community to an-
other without any compensation, such a decision can be potentially blocked
by local administration. Thus, an ecient water distribution is impossible
without market creation, and this market should legalize possession of initial
endowments hold by dierent communities.
The next problem is the ownership of transmission system. To make
things simpler, suppose that it is owned by state but regulated, so that oper-
ate as natural monopolist with zero prot, in order to reach more eciency.
The paper will focus mainly on this legal framework.
Paper structure. In section 3, simple models without explicit accounting
for space and 
ows are analysed. It is shown that uniform pricing incurs
additional losses even for a monopolist. The section 4 is devoted to spatial
analysis. First, the local price is obtained taking into account supply cost.
Then, consumer (agricultural producer) optimisation problem is solved. Fi-
nally, the equilibrium price of land rent and farmers settlement on space is
obtained. Note, that the spatial structure is very sensitive to water pricing
mechanism, and since water supplier is a natural monopolist, there should be
6perfect social regulation and accounting to prevent its negative in
uence on
the market. Finally, the conclusions and policy implications are formulated.
3 Simple Models
The problem of water relocation in space sets many sub-problems on dierent
level of economic theory. The goal of this section is to analyse them from the
point of view of selecting relevant factors, predicting relevant policy issues
and analysing eciency. These preparations are necessary before introducing
more advanced model that treats space continuously.
3.1 Leontie Production Function
Natural resource economics often uses generalized Cobb-Douglas production
function (see for example [4], p.570), with not only capital and labour, but
also with term describing energy and material inputs. If some particular
material (here water) becomes scarce, it makes sense to focus on its in
uence
rather than on in
uence of typically considered labour and capital. In the
case of agriculture in zones with not sucient sun (for example, for produc-
tion of fresh vegetables in cold zones and/or times of the year) such an input
can be energy, while in zones with not sucient rainfall or little access to
rivers, water becomes such a natural input.
Assume two geographically dierent regions, 1 and 2 (one may think
about Catalonia and Murcia). They have dierent endowments of sun (S)
and water (W) per unit of territory. Most agricultural plants require both
inputs, and for mathematical simplicity we will assume that generalized agri-
cultural product is produced using both of these inputs and is of Leontie-
type:
Y1 = minfS1;W1g; Y2 = minfS2;W2g: (1)
Assume also that S1 + S2 = W1 + W2  E, but S1 < S2, while W1 > W2.
In other terms, region 1 (Catalonia) has relatively scarse sun and relatively
abundant in water, while for region 2 (Murcia) the opposite is true.
73.2 Trade Arrangement
Are these factors geographically mobile? Sun is clearly immobile, while
water can be mobile, although transport costs are substantial. Denote re-
gion's imbalance by   W1   S1 = S2   W2. Pareto ecient allocations
would be those with  = 0. They will allow to produce the total output
Y = Y1 +Y2 = E, while the current total production equals to E  . That
is why reallocation can create surplus, and central planner can do it by chan-
nel construction. But is there some decentralized market mechanism for such
a trade? If sun would be tradable, the simplest solution would be to trade
some sun for water between regions 1 and 2. However, it is not tradable. In
this case, the region 1 should get some compensation for transferring some
part of its water endowment to region 2. One may think of selling water as
of capital investment in region 2, and region 1 can get back some part of
additionally produced agricultural product from there.
Clearly, Leontie production function is a toy model, and its main weak-
ness is non-dierentiablity. But it helped us to understand the economic
context. If we replace it by other, dierentiable, production function, we
can come to similar result: marginal value of water in region 1 is lower than
its marginal value in region 2: MV1 < MV2. If transport cost (which in-
cludes construction cost of channel, spread with discount over exploitation
period, operation cost and physical loss (evaporation)) per unit of water is
below this dierence in marginal values, transfer of water can be mutually
benecial. The dierent between value dierential and transport cost repre-
sents the \pie" (term from bargaining theory) that has to be split between
two regions. In decentralized framework the outcome depends on regional
bargaining powers, but we can also assume that the decision of Central gov-
ernment is taken to give 1 to region 1 and 2 to region 2. If such decisions
are taken, then the region 1 will sell water at price p1 = MV1 + 1 and
region 2 will buy it at price p2 = MV2   2, while the dierence between
prices should be equal to transport cost : p2   p1 = . In this case, sup-
plying company will operate at zero prots. However, such a company is a
natural monopoly (building two channels to have oligopoly is too costly) and
its should be regulated. Now we would like to see what costs and incentives
exist for it, and whether spatial structure could be as simple as we have at
the moment.
83.3 Monopolistic Water Pricing, Losses and Eciency
Assume that the channel is an interval [0;a]], and consumers are uniformly
distributed around it. Such types of models have been studied, for example,
in [6,7]. Suppose that individual demand functions are identical and linear:
q = 1   p. In the simplest case, unsophisticated monopolist charges uniform





(1   p)dx = a(1   p): (2)
Physical losses. It is well known from physics, that water can evaporate in
an open channel and/or ltrate through imperfections in the channel borders.
These losses depend on distance and are typically of Samuelson type. The
quantity delivered to point x is linked to the quantity sent at point 0 by
the formula: q(x) = q(x;0)exp( 
x), where 
 is coecient of losses. The
easiness of this formulation is that all losses to individual consumers are
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a) can be innitely small for suciently low 
a. This formula
suggests that the share of technological losses is L=D = 
a=2.
Monopolistic uniform pricing. Suppose that unsophisticated monopo-
list knows the quantity of losses in a channel (they can be calculated by engi-
neers) but does not understand that price can be charged non-uniformly (he
needs to know spatial economics, which typically in not studied in economic
departments). Suppose he can buy any amount of water at point x = 0 from
region 1 at 
at price p0 (which equals to p1), sell water at uniform price p and
incur physical losses (which can be calculated using asymptotical formula).
Then he solves the following optimisation problem:
max
p [a(1   p)(p   p0)   p0(1   p)
a
2=2]: (5)










Note that @p=@a > 0, i.e. price is increasing with the length of channel.
The issue of eciency. When economists analyse eciency in monopo-
listic environment, they typically compare the sum of producer and consumer
surpluses under dierent market structures. The dierence in total welfare is
viewed then as \deadweight loss" arising from monopolistic market structure.
In this case, the situation is a bit more dicult since we face also physical
loss, L. Also, since perfect competition is impossible here, it is useful to select
\zero-prot monopolist" as a benchmark model. If consumers buys water at










The producer surplus is simply his prot , and the social welfare. SW, is





2 + a(1   p)(p   p0)   p0(1   p)
a
2=2: (8)
In the benchmark case,  = 0, and p = p0(1+
a=2). Any prot of monopolist
will lead to decline in demand and the decline of physical loss. At the same
time, the triangular of the initial consumer surplus will shrink so that part
of it will be monopolistic prot and part-deadweight loss. In our case, the
deadweight loss will be exactly one half of physical loss. Thus, we have two
opposite eects on monopoly: increase in welfare loss in region 2 and decline
of physical loss of water. This leads to a necessity to introduce interregional
welfare analysis.
How to measure interregional welfare analysis? Suppose that in re-
gion 1 the demand for water in similar, but equilibrium price is lower. Any
quantity taken out from this market also diminishes the social surplus. But
we assume that consumers and producers are compensated their by the rev-
enue from water sale and thus are better o. We will not go into direct
calculations, we just mention that direct losses of water can re
ect the loss
10in welfare of region 1, and thus should be also minimized. The problem of
optimal balance between welfare gain in region 2 and the physical losses can
be better address if we assume that price p0 is not 
at (which is correct only
for large region) but depends on quantity of water transferred from region 1
to 2.
4 Model in Continuous Space
In general case, we have to consider all productive factors, social (labour,
capital) as well as natural (water, sun, land). At the same time, it makes
sense to reduce complexity and to keep most relevant factors. While we per-
fectly understand the importance of such factors like labour and capital, we
will not focus much on the them. As for labour, it is assumed that all users
of water are individual farmers, supply their labour inelastically and labour
endowment is not binding given the size of their farms. The role of capi-
tal in traditional agricultural technologies is limited. It is really important
in water infrastructure, but here it comes as external factor for agricultural
community which pays the price for its services (water).
The role of trade-o between sun and water was considered above. Land
is a natural input in agriculture, and land rent is the price of this input.
We would like to use production function that uses only land and water.
Why? Because capital and labour are much more mobile factors in com-
parison with land (completely immobile) and water (partially mobile after
huge investment in infrastructure). While competition set equilibrium price
to mobile factors, immobile factors have the prices that depend on particular
location. Since we focus on a model in heterogeneous space, land and water
become such factors that are subject to spatial pricing. In other words, in-
stead of a unique price of commodity we have to introduce a continuum of
prices that depend on location.
Before doing to such pricing, we have to introduce physical equation of
water transportation in a channel.
114.1 Equation for Water Flow
The free 
ow of water in a condition of a desert resembles the dynamics of
mass of an iceberg: water evaporates, while iceberg melts. Under constant
physical external condition, the speed of evaporation is proportional to cur-
rent mass. Hence, we have "iceberg" transport cost of Samuelson type. In
conditions with cold climate or delivery in a closed tube, this eect can be
neglected.
Let (x) denotes the 
ow of water (in cub.m per sec) at point x along the
channel. For simplicity, the speed of water is normalized to 1. If c(x) denotes
consumption density (the water consumption on the interval [x;x + dx] is
c(x)dx) and  is coecient of evaporation, then the 
ow satises the following
equation:

0(x) =  (x)   c(x): (9)
This is a physical 
ow of 
uid dynamics. However, consumption c(x) is af-
fected by economic forces. This consumption depends on price and represents
the balance between demand and supply. Since losses for water delivery in
more distant area are higher, with identical demand, equilibrium price there
should be also higher. This is an ecient mechanism, but it need to be im-
plemented under particular market structure. The further part of the model
will focus on economics.
4.2 Assumptions
1. The channel is formally represented by an interval [0;1].
2. There are N a priori identical consumers which can choose their lo-
cation along channel. If agents are located along the channel with density
(x), then the land endowment per agent is an inverse function of density:
S(x) = 1=(x).
3. Agents have an agricultural production technology, which involves two
inputs: water, c, and land, S. It is assumed to be of Cobb-Douglas type:
Y (x) = S(x)1 aC(x)a, where a 2 (0;1).
124. Agents are identical ex ante, but are located in heterogeneous space.
That is why equilibrium land rent should balance price of water in such a
way, that every agent is paying the same total cost and produces the same
physical output.
The price of water depends on market mechanism. We start from ecient
pricing, and then compare the result with monopolistic pricing, with and
without discrimination. A possibility of competition in water supply industry
as well as regulation of monopoly will also be discussed.
4.3 Solution 1: Water Price is Regulated at Cost Level
Suppose that cost of one unit of water at x = 0 is w. Sometimes water is a
free good, but in this model it is both scarce resource and capital good. Price
at the beginning of a channel should be at least of the level of its cost. Later
along channel some physical losses of water take place, and its cost should be
higher. While water supply owner might not account for this heterogeneity,
it takes place and can incur ineciency. We start from the case when water
is priced at the level of its cost.
How much water will reach point x? Suppose there is no consumption
between points 0 and x. Then the equation 0(x) =  (x) has a solution:
(x) = 0e x. Since agent is free to choose a point of consumption, ecient
pricing should correspond to equality of p(x)(x) = const, or: p(x) = wex.
This corresponds to the law of preservation of value of what is left from water
sent from point x = 0, during its transportation (and evaporation) along the
channel.
It is necessary to make a couple of comments. First, such pricing does
not involve cost of water delivery, and assumes only cost to build and op-
erate channel, independently on 
ow structure inside it. If delivery involves
cost (like in gas or oil industry, when pumping along the way is necessary),
heterogeneity of cost will be even higher. Second, there is additivity of dier-
ent 
ows. We can decompose total 
ow going via cross section into sub
ow
aiming to reach point x1 and point x2. Then each sub
ow loses a propor-
tional fraction of it along each unit of channel. Hence, there is no externality
across dierent consumers, if pricing is done exponentially. Moreover, we can
separate accounting for each consumer, assigning such price dierential that
13takes into account the equal cost of each cub.m of water sent to the consumer
from the beginning of a channel.
We will start from consumer optimisation problem. Then aggregation will
be done. For any p(x), land rent price R(x) will emerge, so that consumers of
water (farmers) will choose to use a particular amount of water C(x) and land
slot of particular size S(x), which is optimal for them given prices of both
factors. Moreover, they will be indierent across locations, and exactly N
farmers will be allocated there, all having dierent land slots (S0(x) > 0) and
dierent water consumption (C0(x) < 0), but producing the same amount of
output and having identical expenditure for land rent and water.
4.4 Consumer Optimisation Problem




a   p(x)C(x)   R(x)S(x)]: (10)
He takes p(x) and R(x) as given. Here p(x) is external function, while R(x) is
determined in a general equilibrium framework.5 The rst order conditions,
(1   a)(C=S)
a = R; a(S=C)
1 a = p; (11)









Since we have CRS, the equilibrium level of output cannot be determined.
But we have already determined the optimal ratio of inputs as a function of
prices (which will be dierent in dierent locations x). Now we need to turn
to market clearing conditions. For given price pattern of water p(x), agents
should compete for land. In equilibrium, they will divide it in such slots S(x)
and establish such land rent R(x), that: a) agents are indierent, b) all land
used. Next subsection is devoted to mathematical implementation of these
ideas.
5Traditionally for microeconomics, general equilibrium endogeneously determine all
functions. This is a slight mathematical modication, where all principles are similar
(prices taken as given, market for land clears). We are interested in a response of a
complex system on external function p(x).
144.5 Market Equilibrium Conditions
Identical agents should be indierent. Since agents in equilibrium
should be indierent across locations, they should produce the same out-
put Y0 (we ignore here transport cost to deliver output to the market and
assume identical price for output in all locations). Moreover, they should
accrue identical cost, with proportions a and 1 a going to dierent factors.
Thus,
S(x)R(x) = (1   a)Y0; (13)
p(x)C(x) = aY0: (14)
Allocation of land. Since all land along the channel has production value,
it should have positive price and all used in equilibrium. We have N agents,
and each of them is located in dierent point xi, where he owns land slot of
size Si. The condition of all land being used is:
PN
i=1 Si = 1. Moreover, each
subinterval of x 2 [0;1] should belong to one and only one owner. Skipping










Consider Y0 to be a parameter, and for given p(x), express all unknowns via
p(x) and Y0. For our case of regulated water price at cost level, p(x) = wex,





























1 axdx = Y0N: (19)
6We go to continuous limit, renormalize measure of farmers to one and use the inverse














Results and policy implications. We obtained equilibrium location of
agents, price of land and consumption of land and water by each agent. Note
that a change of pricing policy p(x) would change the structure of the whole
equilibrium. Land rent will change. It means that value of property of a par-
ticular farmer in a desert is vulnerable and depends on the pricing policy for
water. If the property rights for land are already established, any change in
pricing policy of water supplier would perturb wealth distribution of farmers,
making some of them poorer. That is why any changes of pricing policy by
suppliers of utilities should be done carefully, with study of all consequences
for users. In this case market is not always ecient.
But here we are more concerned with issues of eciency. In the next
sections we will consider an unregulated monopolist owning a channel. He
may use 
at price or make price discrimination. The eciencies of dierent
schemes can be measured by total output produced, total water used.
5 A Monopolist without Price Discrimina-
tion
Suppose now that a channel is owned by monopolist. Assume rst that ini-
tial land ownership is uniform: each agent owns 1=N units of land, but all in
dierent locations. If price of water is charged uniformly (at level W, which
will be chosen by a monopolist to maximize prots), all agents will have the
same production plans: to spend share a of expenditures on water, and 1 a
on land rent. Again C=S = aR=((1   a)p). Now land rent price R will be
uniform, but again depend on water price.
Putting aside some diculties related to optimal price determination (it
depends on cost of water for a rm), let us concentrate on ineciency that
can emerge. Even if water supplier takes into account the cost of lost water
during delivery, uniform pricing mechanism does not encourage the remote
consumer to save water. Losses of water in the system will be greater than
16in previous case, and total water used to produced identical output will be
also higher. If total supply of water is limited by either river capacity, or
environmental restrictions, the mechanism of uniform pricing will generate
lower total output.
6 Conclusions
1. The new economic question related to water pricing in spatially dis-
tributed market is addressed. At the moment such market is not yet created
and it cannot emerge spontaneously, without corresponding legal framework.
2. Moreover, the particular infrastructure makes a channel for water dis-
tribution a natural monopoly prots of which should be regulated. At the
same time, the spatial structure of losses will make this monopoly an in-
centive to set spatial prices in such a way, that eciency in consumption is
reached.
3. The channel will aect the whole pattern of agricultural production in
its neighbourhood. If we assume for simplicity only two production factors
- water and land rent, than any water pricing will result in emergence of
equilibrium land rent distribution in space.
4. If agriculture is done by small farmers who are the only workers on
their land andf if such farmers are equally wealthy ex-ante, then in the new
market equilibrium they will settle with a variable population density along
the channel, so that the spatial dierences in water prices with be compen-
sated by lower land rent in such a way that they produce the same amount
of output at their farms, using dierent factor intensities in production.
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